# repeated games mcq

NTS Computer MCQs. let P = 300 -5Q world demand for oil(where Q is total production and q. be the production of country i). If 2 always defects, then 1 is normal in odd periods and switches to revenge in even periods (because 2 defects). the game that demonstrates the basic problem facing noncolluding oligopolists. NTS Pakistan Studies MCQs. c. it is not involved in a repeated game. Study the subgame perfect equilibrium of the entire game in which firm. The ``grim trigger’’ strategy is such that a player cooperates as long as the other does and defects forever after if the other player defects. a. b. b. the list of what each player played at t, a list of what has happened in every period up to the present, ) the list of what happened in each of the first t periods. Which of the following describes a Nash equilibrium? Graphical Educational content for Mathematics, Science, Computer Science. Consider a repeated game such that with probability p the game continues to the next period and with prob (1-p) it ends. All firms have a dominant strategy, but only some choose to follow it. In previous question does a promise to beat the price charged by another firm promote or inhibit competition? The set of weighted averages of the points (x, ). ... Repetition of a game (Repeated Game): A Yields the same outcome over and over . Consider a “grim trigger” threat as part of a strategy: if there is a deviation from the prescribed production, go to producing q=11.2 forever after. d. All of the above are examples of strategic behavior. 40 Jobs MCQS in PDF File Click Here. So they can enforce any strategy profile that guarantees that agent at most that maxminvalue, by threatening to play the minmax strategy forever if he ever rebels. -Algebraic, exponential, log, trigonometric,polynomial functions, Linear Algebra - Problems Based on Simultaneous Equations, Eigenvalues, Eigenvectors, Probability: Part 1 - Continuous & Discrete Variables, Chebyshev Inequality, Problems, Probability Distributions- Discrete/Continuous- Bernouilli/Binomial/Geometric/Uniform/etc, Basic Mechanics: Introduction to Vectors and Motion, Basic Mechanics: More on Vectors and Projectile Motion, Engineering Mechanics: Moments and Equivalent Systems, Engineering Mechanics: Centroids and Center of Gravity, Engineering Mechanics: Analysis of Structures, Basic Electrostatics and Electromagnetism, Basic Electrostatics: Some Interesting Problems, Basic Electromagnetism: Some Interesting Problems, Electrostatics and Electromagnetism: A Quick Look at More Advanced Concepts, Atomic Structure: Notes, Tutorial, Problems with Solutions, The Book Corner for Computer Science and Programming Enthusiasts, Arrays and Searching: Binary Search ( with C Program source code), Arrays and Sorting: Insertion Sort ( with C Program source code, a tutorial and an MCQ Quiz on Sorting), Arrays and Sorting: Selection Sort (C Program/Java Program source code, a tutorial and an MCQ Quiz on Sorting), Arrays and Sorting: Merge Sort ( C Program/Java Program source code, a tutorial and an MCQ Quiz on Sorting), Arrays and Sorting: Quick Sort (C Program/Java Program source code; a tutorial and an MCQ Quiz ), Data Structures: Stacks ( with C Program source code), Data Structures: Queues ( with C Program source code). Visualizations are in the form of Java applets and HTML5 visuals. NTS Electrical Engineering MCQs. Multiplication can be defined in terms of repeated addition. has 4 elements: (L,L) (L,R) (R,L) and (R,R). But is it possible to sustain co-operation if the game is played finite number of times? c. All firms have a dominant strategy, and none choose it. You scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours. b. it is a dominant strategy. And what that means is, each player gets a sequence of payoffs, let's say, Player I gets the sequence R1 in the first repetition, R2 in the second repetition, R3, just on and on infinitely. Comments. Which per period payoff is not both feasible and enforceable: The maximin value of each player is 1.Thus (5, 0) is not enforceable since it gives player 2 an expected lower than her maximin value. b. establish a credible deterrent to the entry of competing firms. Game Theory: Lecture 16 Repeated Games Repeated Games By repeated games, we refer to a situation in which the same stage game (strategic form game) is played at each date for some duration of T periods. Let δ∈(0,1)be the common discount factor, and G(δ,T)represent the repeated game, b. may be accomplished by protecting and subsidizing selected industries. a. a part of every game theory model? He finds that the correlation between the two variables is .40 and has a regression coefficient of .25. d. attain a Nash equilibrium and avoid repeated games. If r is an equilibrium payoff vector in G’ then e in enforceable, If r is enforceable and feasible, then it is an equilibrium payoff vector in G, Consider the following game to be played 100 times. In game theory, a choice that is optimal for a firm no matter what its competitors do is referred to as. If she deviates to C in the first period of the subgame, then adheres to tit-for-tat, the outcome is (C, C) in every period, and her discounted average payoff is x. Firm i’s preferences are represented by its profit, equal to p, )/m) if firm i is one of m firms setting the lowest price (m = 1 if firm i’s price pi is lower than every other price), and equal to zero if some firm’s price is lower than p, Now each firm’s unit cost is a constant equal to “c”.Let, =(p-c)D(p) for every price p and assume D is such that, is a continuous function and has a single maximiser denoted by p, be the strategy of firm i in the indefinitely repeated game of this game that charges  p, in the first period and subsequently as long as other firm continues to charge p, and punishes any deviation from it by other firm by choosing the price, periods, then reverting back to it. A single good is produced by n firms; each firm can produce qi units of the good at a cost of C. ). This theorem characterizes many Nash Equilibriums rising in indefinite games. All of these MCQs are important and helpful for upcoming jobs tests in PPSC, PMS, NTS, PTS, FPSC, KPPSC, BPSC, SPSC competitive exams. Of course, in all these examples, there is a strong argument to be made that the game itself changes over time. A prisoners' dilemma is a game with all of the following characteristics except one. a strategy used in repeated games where players work together to plan what moves each will make in each round (MCQ)What is the prisoner’s dilemma? A demand function is also defined whose interpretation is that if the good is available at the price p then the total amount demanded is D(p). we can look at how the game will continue, ) denote the strategy for the remainder of the game after a history h, Sub Game perfect equilibrium: for all i and h. Probability p that the game continues next period, probability (1-p) that it ends. If 2 always cooperates, then 1 stays 'normal' and cooperates always as well, and the payoff to each player is 4 in each period. Until recently, medical doctors and lawyers have been prohibited from engaging in competitive advertising. to be feasible if it is the payoff under some mixed strategy with rational weights. Explanation are given for understanding. MCQ multiple choice questions and answers on Hockey Trivia Quiz. Beta takes into the account that “present” is more important than “future”. As opposed to one-shot games, repeated games introduce a new series of incentives: the possibility of cooperating means that we may decide to compromise in order to carry on receiving a payoff over time, knowing that if we do … When cooperating, each country earns 800  with a payoff 800 + 800β/(1-β) . Primary Level Pdf File MCQS Click Here. 8.1 Finitely repeated games List of all ICSE and ISC Schools in India ( and abroad ). Easier to sustain cooperation as probability continue increases, Sustain cooperation by threatening to resort to permanent defection if cooperation fails, If the threat is ``credible’’: it is an equilibrium, If there is a high enough weight on future interactions, then it is possible to sustain behaviours that were not possible in the short run. October 3, 2020 at 10:51 pm. d. the migration patterns of caribou in Alaska. ), DC Circuits: Examples and Problems, Circuits with Resistance and Capacitance, DC Circuits: Problems related to RL, LC, RLC Circuits, DC Circuits: Electrical Networks and Network Theorems, DC Circuits: More Network Theorems, Examples, Solved Problems, Basic Digital Circuits: Boolean Algebra-1, Basic Digital Circuits: Boolean Algebra-2, Basic Digital Circuits: Combinational Circuits-1, Basic Digital Circuits: Combinational Circuits-2, Basic Digital Circuits: Sequential Circuits-1, Basic Digital Circuits: Sequential Circuits-2, Top Schools & School-wise results (CBSE 2015 Class 12 Examinations), Top Schools & School-wise Results (ISC 2015, Class 12 Exams), Top Schools & School-wise Results (RBSE 2015 Class 12, Rajasthan State), Top Schools & School-wise results (CBSE 2014 Class 12 Examinations), Top Schools & School-wise Results (ICSE-ISC 2014 Examinations), Top Schools & School-wise results (ICSE-ISC 2013 Class 10 & 12 Examinations), ISC Class 12: Syllabus, Specimen Papers, Books. (D, D) If player 1 adheres to tit-for-tat the outcome is (D, D) in every period, so that her discounted average payoff is 1. these Multiple Chocie Question Answers are also helpful for computer operaotrs and Data Entry Operators tests. d)Only (Good, Not) appears in each period. Thus we need 1 ≥ βy/(1 + β), or β ≤ 1/(y − 1), for a one-period deviation from tit-for-tat not to be profitable for player 1. Let p* be the threshold such that when p≥p*, cooperation is sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium by the "grim trigger" strategy (under which each player cooperates as long as the other does and defects forever after if either player deviates), and when p